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Abstract
This article puts Down’s instrumental voter model (IVM) to a formal test using data of 
the 2017 Chilean national elections. It aims at two novel exercises in the research in the 
calculus of voting. Using a brand- new questionnaire with indicators on instrumental and 
consumption motivations for voting, we reassess the voting equation in Santiago de Chile. 
Furthermore, we analyse whether instrumental and consumption motivations have dis-
tinctive effects for individuals with different socio- demographic characteristics. Our results 
show that they do: women, younger, lower educated, and unmarried citizens are more 
responsive to both instrumental and consumption motivations. Moreover, the factors of 
the IVM travel better to Santiago de Chile than those of the consumption model.
Resumen
Este artículo contrasta formalmente el modelo del votante instrumental de Downs 
empleando datos de las elecciones generales chilenas de 2017. Su objetivo es acometer 
dos ejercicios novedosos en la investigación sobre el cálculo del voto. Utilizando un 
cuestionario muy reciente con indicadores de las motivaciones instrumentales y de 
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consumo para votar, examinamos la ecuación del voto en Santiago de Chile. Asimismo, 
analizamos si las motivaciones instrumentales y de consumo tienen efectos diferentes 
para individuos con distintas características socio- demográficas. Nuestros resultados 
demuestran que así es: las mujeres, los jóvenes, los menos educados y los que no están 
casados son más sensibles tanto a las motivaciones instrumentales como a las de con-
sumo. Además, los factores del modelo del votante instrumental viajan mejor al caso 
chileno que los del modelo de consumo.
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Introduction
Voting is the most central mode of participation in politics (van Deth, 2017; Gallego, 
2015). Answering the question of why people vote has thus become, after the seminal 
book by Downs (1957), one of the most researched fields in political science (Aldrich 
and Jenke, 2017; Aldrich, 1993). It now contains numerous responses, a bewildering 
number of correlates, and a large list of factors associated with the decision to voting or 
abstaining (Smets and van Ham, 2013; Wass and Blais, 2017). Many of the causal mech-
anisms related to these factors are based on Downs’ instrumental voter model (IVM), 
which stresses the role of the subjective perception of the importance of one’s vote (P), 
the party differential or personal benefit if the preferred party wins the election (B), and 
the costs of voting (C). Many others are related to the key alternative explanation, namely 
the consumption voter models (CVMs), which emphasise the role of factors such as the 
belief that there is a duty to vote (DV), the will to sustain democracy (SD), or the social 
pressure to vote (SP).
Take, for instance, amongst many others, a trade union member. Union membership 
may foster electoral participation because, on top of mobilising the rank- and- file, unions 
can enhance the perception of the importance of one’s vote by insisting that all votes 
count (Radcliff and Davis, 2000), magnify the party differential by stressing the differ-
ences amongst parties or candidates (Palfrey and Poole, 1987: 511), and lower the costs 
of voting by facilitating access to political information (Santana and Aguilar, 2019a). 
Likewise, political interest may increase the predisposition to vote inasmuch as it 
increases the perceived importance of one’s vote (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993), the 
party differential (Campbell et al., 1960; Mueller, 1989: 357), the costs of voting (Santana 
and Aguilar, 2019b), and duty (Blais, 2000).
However, empirical research testing the IVM at the individual level is scarce and 
mainly focused on a few advanced democracies. As far as we know, variants of the 
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calculus of voting equation have only been tested with survey data for Canada (Blais 
and Young, 1999; Blais et al., 1995; Blais, 2000; Blais et al., 2000; Bol et al., 2018), 
the Netherlands (Santana, 2008, Santana, 2014), and Spain (Lavezzolo et al., 2010; 
Mata, 2013). Data to test the IVM comes mainly from these countries’ National 
Election Studies, but also from the Making Electoral Democracy Work datasets, 
which contain surveys for Canada, France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland 
(Stephenson et al., 2018). Some studies have provided supplementary evidence 
resorting to experiments, as for instance a test of whether people are more likely to 
vote as the expected payoff increases (Blais et al., 2014), an evaluation of the effects 
of instrumental and consumptive benefits in California (Panagopoulos, 2013), or 
another one on the effect of the subjective probability of affecting election results 
(Duffy and Tavits, 2008).
On top of being scarce, empirical research on the IVM and CVM has more often than 
not focussed on establishing whether the key factors in those models have a statistically 
significant effect on the propensity to vote, and how large these eventual effects are. 
Research aimed at uncovering whether some instrumental or consumption factors have 
larger or smaller effects depending on the levels of other factors is rare, although some 
studies have addressed the interaction between factors of the IVM, like the party differ-
ential, and the CVM, like duty (Blais and Achen, 2019; Bol et al., 2018). Some research 
has also been carried out on how the effects of IVM and CVM factors vary in function of 
institutional factors (Lavezzolo et al., 2010).
In addition, this article undertakes two empirical tests that as far as we know are still 
lacking in the field of models of voting. On the one hand, it carries out an empirical rep-
lication in Latin America, a region in which this type of research simply does not exist, 
at least at the individual level, perhaps due to the absence of datasets with appropriate 
indicators of the models.1 Filling this gap is obviously important because the effects of 
several factors may differ in more recent democracies that usually elicit lower levels of 
support. In the following pages, we will thus test the empirical support for IVMs and 
CVMs in the November 2017 Chilean presidential and parliamentary elections. On the 
other hand, this article aims at disclosing whether the effects of instrumental and con-
sumption factors vary for individuals with different socio- demographic characteristics. 
Although similar relationships have been found for other factors, the study of the inter-
action between socio- demographic characteristics and the factors in the calculus of vot-
ing equation remains a second major lacuna in the field, with a few exceptions, such as 
the studies on whether social pressure affects voting differently for men and women 
(Matland and Murray, 2016; Weinschenk et al., 2018). We know that different individu-
als process information differently, and that reasoning is affected by feelings (Lodge and 
Taber, 2000), prior knowledge (Popkin and Dimock, 2000), and institutions (Lupia and 
McCubbins, 2000). There are thus good reasons to anticipate that citizens’ socio- 
demographic traits could condition their responses to instrumental and non- instrumental 
incentives. For instance, it has been shown that the effects of institutional incentives (like 
voting facilities) are conditioned by individual level factors in Western European coun-
tries (Anduiza, 1999, 2002). Since voting facilities are most likely related to the costs of 
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voting, this suggests that its effect on voting could be conditioned by individual- level 
factors.
The article is organised into seven sections. Whereas the second is a reminder of the 
basics of the instrumental and consumption models, the third examines the suitability of 
the Chilean case. The fourth section presents our hypotheses, and the fifth one, the data 
and indicators as included in the Chilean survey. The next two sections discuss our 
empirical results to the questions of whether the IVM and the CVM fare in Santiago de 
Chile and whether its citizens are similarly responsive to the motivations of each model. 
The final section briefly concludes. Our main findings are twofold. Firstly, we demon-
strate that the IVM works in the same way in Santiago de Chile as in other countries, and 
its indicators do a fairly good job at explaining the propensity to vote or to abstain; in 
contrast, the CVM performs quite poorly. And secondly, we show that different citizens 
respond in heterogenous ways to instrumental and consumption motivations; their effects 
depend upon citizen’s sex, age, education, and civil status.
The Instrumental and Consumption Voter Models: a Reminder
There are two main strands of research to account for the individuals’ decision to turn out 
or not: IVMs and CVMs. Instrumental voter models, as outlined in the classic book by 
Downs (1957) and elaborated by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), Tullock (1968), and more 
recently Aldrich and Jenke (2017), are an application of rational choice models to the 
voting decision. Rational choice accounts of political phenomena and, especially so, the 
IVMs are closely connected with the attempt to apply economic rationality to political 
science: thus, in his 1957 seminal book, Downs applied this logic not only to the voting 
decision but also to the concurrence amongst parties, the problem of the acquisition of 
political information by citizens, or the difficulties posed by retrospective and prospec-
tive voting approaches, amongst many others. For orthodox IVMs, voting is intrinsically 
worthless: it acquires value only as a means or instrument to affect election results. 
These tenets can be summarised by the well- known voting equation:
R = P*B – C,
where R stands for the net payoff of voting; P, for the probability that one’s vote affects 
election outcomes (Darmofal, 2010; Usher, 2014); B, for the party differential, or the 
private benefit that the citizen enjoys if party J instead of party K wins the election 
(Wang, 2013); and C, for the (net) costs of voting (Fraga and Hersh, 2011; Goodman and 
Stokes, 2018). In large electorates, P is objectively negligible, so if voting entails costs, 
purely instrumental citizens should abstain. But, as Copeland and Laband (2002) and 
many others noted, the ensuing prediction of overspread abstention is systematically 
contradicted by medium to high levels of electoral participation. This mismatch between 
the prediction of generalised abstention and actual turnout figures is known as the “par-
adox of not voting” or the “paradox of voting” (Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974; Krajina and 
Prochazka, 2018).
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Possibly, the best known attempt to solve the paradox within the rational model rests 
on the assumption that citizens vote to avoid the regret they would feel if they had stayed 
at home and their party had lost by one vote (Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974; Fiorina, 1976). 
There have been other interesting proposals, such as modelling the decision to vote or to 
abstain in game- theoretic terms (Battaglini et al., 2010; Palfrey and Poole, 1987). Still, 
most scholars agree that a proper account of voting cannot be exclusively instrumental.
Consumption voter models construe voting as an end in itself. Citizens vote because 
they place value on the very (f)act of voting. The key to CVMs is that the benefits of 
voting are intrinsic, in that they stem from the act of voting regardless of election results. 
Oftentimes, these intrinsic benefits (customarily labelled as D) are added to instrumental 
ones (captured by the P*B term). There is no commonly agreed, standardised corpus of 
dimensions of intrinsic benefits, so the precise form in which the calculus of voting 
equation is re- written depends on the sources of intrinsic benefits that are considered. 
One of its most popular roots is citizens’ belief that voting constitutes a social or moral 
duty, and their will to conform to it (Blais and Achen, 2019; Galais and Blais, 2016; 
Riker and Ordeshook, 1968: 28). A second one is their belief that voting contributes to 
sustain democracy, and their resolve to do so (Downs, 1957: 270; Hillman, 2010). Still 
a third one is their perception of a social pressure to vote, that is, the belief that voting 
brings about social approval, whereas abstaining elicits censorship (Blais et al., 2018; 
Dellavigna et al., 2017; Gerber et al., 2016; Gerber et al., 2008, Rogers et al., 2017). 
Insofar as voting allows to reap the former and avoid the latter, it can be conceived of as 
having selective social incentives (Knack, 1992), and hence, as a special type of Olson 
(1971) solution to the collective action problem. Some scholars also point to an expres-
sive value of voting (Fieldhouse, 2018; Hamlin and Jennings, 2011; Panova, 2015; 
Schuessler, 2000), linked to the drive to express one’s political preferences, and even to 
a consumptive altruistic term (Aimone et al., 2018; Edlin et al., 2007; Etang et al., 2016; 
Fowler, 2006).
Why Chile?
With the aid of a brand- new dataset on the 2017 Chilean presidential and parliamentary 
elections, which incorporates the main indicators of the IVM and CVM, we are able to 
test them in Santiago de Chile. But this window of opportunity is reinforced by two 
broad theoretical considerations about the increasing levels of non- voting in Chile and 
the type of explanatory factors discussed in the Chilean literature about turnout.
Chile fulfils the features that Blais (2006) identified as ideal for having high levels of 
turnout, that is, it is a medium size country, has the best economic indicators in Latin 
America, enjoys well- working institutions, and holds highly competitive elections 
which, since 2005, have been moreover concurrent. However, its turnout levels have 
decreased almost steadily in the last three decades, from 89 per cent in the 1988 plebi-
scite to only 46 per cent in the first round of the last 2017 presidential and parliamentary 
elections – a decline of no less than 39 percentage points.2 Whilst in the last twenty- five 
years, turnout has increased in Latin America (PNUD, 2017: 8), Chile became the most 
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abstentionist country in the region (Contreras et al., 2016; PNUD, 2017; Santana et al., 
2019).
Most experts point at two factors for explaining the decreasing trend of Chilean turn-
out: one is institutional, the voluntary registration; the other is socio- demographic, age. 
Regarding the former, Valenzuela (2004) has qualified it as “the most tortuous registra-
tion system,” and Altman and Castiglioni (2018: 111) simply as “perverse.” It was 
designed by Pinochet’s military regime to discourage the registration of citizens who did 
not have too much interest in voting. For the 1988 plebiscite for democracy, and contrary 
to what the leaders of the dictatorship expected, the opportunity to defeat Pinochet led to 
a massive inscription: no less than 7.5 million Chileans, or 92 per cent of the voting age 
population. In the following decades, however, Chileans had few incentives to register 
and therefore to vote. Consequently, about six out of ten of the citizens who in the 1990s 
came of age to vote, and no less than eight out of ten since the 2000s, failed to register. 
In 2012, when an electoral reform changed the register from voluntary to automatic, only 
around 10 per cent of Chileans between 18 and 29 years were registered (Morales et al., 
2010: 14). As Luna (2011) claimed, young Chileans were close to becoming an “elector-
ate threatened to extinction.”3
That young citizens have a problematic relationship with turnout is nothing new. In 
Latin America, a large study in 17 countries with more than 22,000 cases found that “the 
demographic characteristics of voters (age and education) […] are strong predictors of 
electoral participation” (Carreras and Castañeda- Angarita, 2014: 1079). The relevance 
of age to turnout is related to the habit of voting (Dinas, 2017; Franklin, 2004). Thus, 
those who go for the first time to the ballot box have a higher probability to vote in the 
subsequent elections, whereas those who do not cast a vote when they achieve the 
required age are more likely to become chronic abstainers. Several authors have also 
documented the positive and significant effect of age on turnout in Chile (Contreras and 
Morales, 2014; Mackenna, 2015), both before and after the 2012 institutional reform, 
and the results (analysing different kinds of elections, e.g. presidential, parliamentary, 
and local) are consistent to the extent that the young have few incentives- and therefore 
weaker voting habits- to turnout on election day. As emphasised by Corvalán and Cox 
(2013), “there is no other country where the division between the old and young elector-
ate is as striking as in Chile. For older voters, turnout exceeded, on average, 90 per cent 
in 2009; for those aged less than 30, it fell below 30 per cent.”4 (Contreras and Morales, 
2014, 2015; Mackenna, 2015).
The Chilean case is also relevant in advancing our knowledge of the motivations for 
voting. It should prove especially hard to find that socio- demographic individual charac-
teristics condition the effects of IVM or CVM factors on voting. Previous research has 
repeatedly shown that, with the exception of age, socio- demographic factors did not play 
a significant role in the propensity to vote in Chile (Guzmán et al., 2015; Contreras and 
Morales, 2015: 16). This has been at least the dominant interpretation in those elections 
before the 2012 electoral reform, which brought about a change from a non- automatic 
registration and mandatory vote to an automatic registration and voluntary vote 
(Mackenna, 2014, 2015).5 After the reform, some contributions highlighted that the 
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profile of abstentionists changed: due to the higher levels of inequality in Chile,4 low 
educated, low social strata and working- class citizens turn out in a lesser extent than 
those enjoying higher education and belonging to the upper classes (Guzmán et al., 
2015).6 Thus, if the effects of IVM or CVM factors are found to be contingent on socio- 
demographic traits even in Chile, we should a fortiori expect them to be similarly related 
in other settings, where socio- demographic characteristics play a stronger role in explain-
ing turnout (Smets and van Ham, 2013).
Two Basic Hypotheses
Consistent with the two related goals of this paper, we will first put forward a hypothesis 
(H1) regarding the effects of IVM and CVM factors in Santiago de Chile to test how well 
these models fare there; and then, a second hypothesis (H2), on how the IVM and CVM 
factors work for individuals with different socio- demographic characteristics. In princi-
ple, the arguments of the IVM should apply to Chile in a similar way to those in more 
established democracies. In the case of the perceived probability that one’s vote affects 
election outcomes, as in the advanced democracies where Downs’ model has been tested, 
its objective value should be low. Therefore, its effect on voting should largely rest on 
the magnitude of its overestimation, which is likely to be similar in Santiago de Chile.
Moreover, the large ideological differences amongst parties in Chile should imply 
especially strong (positive) effects of the party differential and regret (Luna, 2008).7 
However, the low levels of party identification and high levels of mistrust in parties 
(Luna and Altman, 2011), as well as the difficulties of the Chilean party system to incor-
porate the demands from the society (Morgan and Meléndez, 2016), should work in the 
opposite direction. Hence, on balance, we expect party differential (and regret) to have 
similar effects in Santiago de Chile to those found in advanced democracies. As to the 
costs of voting, considering that registration was automatic in the 2017 elections (Cox 
and González, 2016), it is plausible to believe that for most Chileans the costs of voting 
were, as in most advanced democracies, moderate or low.
Finally, although the direction of the effects of the factors of the CVM should be sim-
ilar in all countries, their magnitude possibly depends largely on the level of support for 
democracies. Given that the fraction of those who consider democracy to be the best 
political system is lower in Chile than in longer established democracies (Castiglioni and 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2016; Santana et al., 2019), it makes sense to expect that duty to vote, 
sustain democracy, and social pressure will have smaller effects (if at all) in Chile than 
in the cases where the CVM has been tested. Thus, considering all the former arguments, 
we formulate our first hypothesis:
H1: The factors of both the IVM and CVM should work in the same direction in Santiago 
de Chile as in advanced democracies: the likelihood of voting should increase with the 
perceived probability that one’s vote affects election outcomes, the party differential, regret, 
duty to vote, sustain democracy, and social approval and decrease with the costs of voting. 
However, the effects of the factors of the CVM should be smaller or even non- significant 
in Chile.
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Let us now turn to the relationship between IVM and CVM factors, on the one hand, 
and socio- demographic variables, on the other. It makes sense to expect that the potential 
benefits of voting, whether instrumental or not, will be especially influential in driving 
those individuals to the polls who might otherwise be more likely to abstain; a similar 
argument would apply to the costs. Electoral research has shown that also in Chile 
younger individuals vote less than older ones (Contreras and Morales, 2014), partly due 
to an age effect and partly to a cohort effect, as the cohorts who voted in the 1988 
Plebiscite vote more than the subsequent ones (Bargsted et al., 2019); and that those who 
are female, less educated, and not married vote less than their counterparts – men, higher 
educated, married (Montero et al., 2019).8 We may thus expect, for instance, that the 
effect of the perceived probability that one’s vote affects election outcomes should be 
larger for women. More generally, our second hypothesis reads as follows:
H2: The positive effects of the perceived probability that one’s vote affects election out-
comes, the party differential, regret, duty to vote, sustain democracy, and social approval 
(as well as the negative effects of the costs of voting) will be larger for women, young, low-
er educated, and unmarried individuals than for men, older, higher educated, and married 
citizens.
Data and Methods
As already said, to test our hypotheses we will utilise a post- election survey undertaken 
after the 2017 Chilean presidential and parliamentary elections and carried out by the 
Faculty of Government, Universidad del Desarrollo, Santiago (UDD, 2018). The survey 
consists of four hundred and eighty- nine face- to- face interviews undertaken in January 
2018, shortly after the second round of the presidential elections. It covers a representa-
tive sample of 23 out of 32 comunas, or administrative units, of Santiago; the sampling 
is probabilistic with a random selection of households and interviewees; for a confidence 
level of 95 per cent, the margin of error is ±4.36 per cent. Although it is broadly repre-
sentative of the population of Santiago in socio- demographic terms, weights have been 
applied in all the statistical analyses so as to further guarantee the representativeness also 
in terms of voter turnout.
Following the standard practice, the dependent variable, which originally distin-
guished amongst four types of abstention (could not vote, did not want to vote, usually 
votes but this time did not want to, and usually votes but this time could not do so), has 
been coded as binary (1 = voted, 0 = abstained). Consequently, binary logistic models 
have been estimated to uncover the effects of independent and control variables upon 
voting.
The UDD survey includes indicators for the subjective probability of affecting elec-
tion results (“so many people vote, that my vote does not affect electoral results”); 
regret (“I would have felt badly if I had not voted and my preferred candidate had lost 
by just one vote”); perceived costs of voting (“voting costs me a lot of effort”); 
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agreement with the idea that voting contributes to sustain democracy (“voting contrib-
utes to sustain democracy”); and perceived social pressure to vote (“my family, friends 
and acquaintances would look down on me if I did not vote”). Originally, they were all 
four- item ordinal scales (strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree) and have 
been recoded as binary (1 = high, 0 = low). Reasons are twofold: because of the rela-
tively low sampling size and because it allows to enhance the comparability of our 
results with those of most extant research, which has generally employed a dichoto-
mous categorisation as well. The survey includes also an indicator for the belief that 
voting is a duty (“for some people voting is a right that may be excercised or not, and 
for others it is a duty”), which is binary from the outset (1 = a duty, 0 = a right). Given 
that no question was directly asked to uncover the size of the perceived party differen-
tial, this concept has been proxied by the closest available alternative, namely whether 
interviewees acknowledged feeling identified with a party (“could you tell me whether 
you feel close to any political party or coalition?” 1 = yes, 0 = no) ‒ the assumption 
being that those who feel identified experience a larger party differential than those who 
do not.
Also following the standard practice in electoral research (Smets and van Ham, 
2013), models have been tested that include four socio- demographic variables which 
could affect the tendency to vote or to abstain. They are sex (binary: 1 = woman), age 
(captured by an ordinal variable with six intervals), education (given the low number of 
those who only have primary education, a binary variable has been used, which tells 
apart those who enjoy higher education, coded as 1, from those who do not, coded as 0), 
and civil status (originally a nominal variable with five options: married, divorced, sep-
arated, widow/er, and single; recoded as binary: 1 = married). On top of variables of the 
IVM and CVM, only socio- demographic controls are considered; hence, variables such 
as ideology and political interest do not form part of any of the models. All the variables 
can be simultaneously included in the model without arising collinearity problems: the 
highest correlation amongst them is 0.45; the highest variance inflation factor (VIF), 
1.58, and the mean VIF, 1.24. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics (observations, 
mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum), as well as the VIFs of the 
variables.
Although the majority of articles in the top social sciences journals still get it wrong 
(Mize, 2019), methodologists and statisticians have demonstrated that regression coef-
ficients are not useful for evaluating interactive hypotheses when the dependent vari-
able is binary or, more generally, qualitative (Mustillo et al., 2018). The correct approach 
was pioneered in the social sciences by Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al. (2004). 
Following their advice and the strategies advocated by Mize (2019), and making use as 
well of the SPost 13 command (Long and Freese, 2014), we employ a graphical 
approach to discuss the results of our interactive hypotheses. Naturally, in all the inter-
active models we include all the constitutive terms as well as the interactive one, since 
failing to do so would open the possibility of obtaining biased estimations (Brambor 
et al., 2006).
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How Well Do the IVM and CVM Fare in Santiago De Chile?
Figure 1 is a coefficient plot showing the results of a battery of models that consider 
alternative specifications of the calculus of voting equation. For each variable, the point 
represents the best estimation of its effects on voting; the horizontal line, the confidence 
intervals associated with that estimation. When the confidence intervals cross the verti-
cal line, the variable is not statistically significant. Model 1 (IVM) only includes instru-
mental motivations: the subjectively perceived probability of affecting election results 
(P), the proxy for the party differential (B), the regret if the citizen abstained and her 
preferred party lost for only one vote, and the cost of voting (C). Model 2 is a purely 
consumptive model, including duty to vote, sustain democracy, and social disapproval 
(as well as C). Model 3 includes both types of motivations, and Model 4 adds the four 
socio- demographic variables: woman, age (treated as a quantitative variable; results 
remain qualitatively unaltered if age is treated as ordinal; see below), education, and 
married. Consistent with H1, the sign of the effects of the perceived probability of affect-
ing election results, the party differential, regret, duty, sustain democracy, and social 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Independent and Control Variables
Variables Count Mean SD Min. Max. VIF
Dependent variable
Voted (yes) 476 0.43 0.50 0 1
IVM variables
Probability of affecting (high) 474 0.65 0.48 0 1 1.07
Party differential (high)a 472 0.19 0.39 0 1 1.20
Regret (high) 447 0.55 0.50 0 1 1.33
Costs of voting (high) 465 0.20 0.40 0 1 1.12
CVM variables
Duty to vote (yes) 469 0.45 0.50 0 1 1.12
Sustain democracy (high) 461 0.74 0.44 0 1 1.34
Social disapproval (high) 461 0.26 0.44 0 1 1.15
Control variables
Age groupb 489 3.21 1.82 1 6 1.58
Woman (yes) 489 0.55 0.50 0 1 1.07
Married (yes) 487 0.31 0.46 0 1 1.36
Education (university) 480 0.24 0.43 0 1 1.24
Source: This and all other figures and tables are our own elaboration, and come from the UDD post- 
election survey, 2018.
Note: CVM = consumption voter model; IVM = instrumental voter model; VIF = variance inflation factor.
aProxied by party identification.
bAvailable as an ordinal variable: 1 = 18–25 years; 2 = 26–35; 3 = 36–45; 4 = 46–55; 5 = 56–65; 6 = 66 
years or more.
Santana et al. 87
pressure are positive in all models, whilst that of the cost of voting is consistently nega-
tive. Except for the party differential, all the variables of the IVM are statistically signif-
icant (at the 5 per cent level) in all models. Duty to vote is never significant- this may be 
due to the recent institutional change from compulsory to voluntary voting (Guzmán 
et al., 2015); in the Chilean case, questions trying to measure the duty concept are not 
comparable to those asked in other countries, since interviewees may understand that 
they are being asked about the new legal standing of voting instead of about the exis-
tence of a social or moral obligation to vote. The other two variables of the CVM, sustain 
democracy and social pressure, are only significant in Model 2, but fail to be so when 
those of the IVM are also included. This is, again, consistent with H1, in that we expected 
much weaker effects of the IVM in Santiago de Chile, given its relatively lower levels of 
democratic support. Finally, as to the socio- demographic controls, notice that sex and 
civil status fall short of statistical significance, whereas education and age significantly 
increase the likelihood of voting.
Figure 1 informs us about the signs and statistical significance of the effects on voting 
of each variable in the models. But, given that the dependent variable (voting) is binary, 
the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients tell us little about substantive questions such 
as the relative strength of the effects of each independent variable. To remedy this, 
Figure 2 displays the average marginal effects (AMEs) on the probability of voting of 
each variable for the full model, as well as for an additional model in which we treat age 
as an ordinal variable. The AMEs are calculated as follows: for each observation of the 
dataset, they firstly estimate the marginal effect of a given variable (holding all other 
independent variables constant) on our dependent variable (voting), and then they 
Figure 1. Coefficient Plot for the Effects of Instrumental and Non- Instrumental Motivations 
on Voting in Santiago de Chile, 2017.
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average the marginal effects for all the observations calculated in the previous step. 
Intuitively, the AMEs compare the probability of voting between two populations that 
only differ in one trait (i.e. being male or female), but share all the remaining character-
istics (Williams, 2012).
The comparison of Models 4 and 5 in Figure 2 confirms that the effects of the inde-
pendent variables are almost equal when we treat age as quantitative to those found 
when we consider it ordinal. Moreover, it shows that regret has a very large effect, 
slightly above 0.3. Hence, controlling for all the other variables, regret would be respon-
sible for a change of about 30 percentage points in the probability of voting. The other 
two statistically significant variables, the perceived probability of affecting election 
results and the cost of voting, have more moderate and rather similar effects, ranging 
from 12 to 16 percentage points. Thus, instrumental benefits (as captured by the per-
ceived probability of affecting election results and regret) have more weight on the vot-
ing decisions in Santiago de Chile than the cost of voting, and consumption benefits 
(duty, support democracy and social pressure) do not have any (statistically significant) 
weight at all.
Interestingly, as Model 5 in Figure 2 shows (the one where age is treated as ordinal), 
the second largest effects are associated with age: whilst those younger than 46 do not 
significantly differ from under-26- year- olds, those older than 45 exhibit a probability of 
Figure 2. Average Marginal Effects of Instrumental and Non- Instrumental Motivations on 
Voting in Santiago de Chile, 2017.
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voting between 18 and 20 percentage points higher. The salience of age in Santiago de 
Chile is probably due to the effects of its institutional rules until 2012, which combined 
voluntary registration and compulsory voting amongst those previously registered, 
therefore inhibiting registration and substantively reducing the electoral participation 
amongst younger cohorts.
In turn, Figure 3 displays the predictive margins of the probability of voting for each 
of the three variables in the calculus of voting equation that significantly affect the pro-
pensity to vote (the perceived probability of affecting election results, regret, and the 
cost of voting, as shown in Model 4). For each variable, the predictive margins are cal-
culated holding all the other variables constant at their means. The probability of voting 
for those who think that their vote does not affect election results (i.e. that P is low) is 40 
per cent, but it goes up to 53 per cent amongst those who believe that their vote can have 
an influence (i.e. that P is high). As we already know from Figure 2, the probability of 
voting changes most notably with regret; now we can see that it doubles from 31 per cent 
amongst those who would not regret having abstained if their party lost by only one vote 
and mounts to a full 62 per cent amongst those who would regret it. Finally, it drops from 
51 per cent when the cost of voting is low to 35 per cent when it is high. Results are 
almost equal if the predictive margins are computed on the basis of Model 5.
Table 2 shows the predictive margins of voting for each possible combination of the 
three variables that have turned out to be significant in the previous models – the per-
ceived probability of affecting election results, regret, and the cost of voting. It shows 
Figure 3. Predictive Margins of Voting as a Function of the Perceived Probability of Affecting 
Election Results, Regret, and Cost of Voting in Santiago de Chile, 2017
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that, considered together, these three variables of the IVM allow to explain changes in the 
predicted probability of voting ranging from roughly 0.10 (when the perceived probabil-
ity of affecting election results and regret are low, and the cost of voting is high) to 0.71 
(when the perceived probability of affecting election results and regret are high, and the 
cost of voting is low). Thus, these variables can account for differences of 60 percentage 
points in the probability of voting.
Are All Citizens Similarly Responsive to Instrumental and Non-Instrumental 
Motivations?
Figure 4 illustrates the interactive effects on voting of IVM or CVM variables and socio- 
demographic ones. To be more precise, it shows that the average marginal effects of IVM 
or CVM variables on voting depend on the levels of socio- demographic variables. An 
advantage of using AMEs is that they are not affected by unobserved heterogeneity that 
is unrelated to the independent variables (Mood, 2010). Of the twenty- eight potential 
interactions, nine display interesting interacting patterns. In other words, the effects of an 
IVM or CVM variable on voting vary in function of the values of a socio- demographic 
variable; Figure 4 only shows these.
The upper left panel of Figure 4 shows the average marginal effects of the cost of 
voting for the six age groups. Leaving aside the youngest individuals, for which the 
effect is close to zero, the effect of the cost of voting is consistently negative, and its 
magnitude increases markedly with age. Thus, whilst perceiving high instead of low 
costs of voting only depresses by 4.5 per cent the turnout of those in the 25–36 age group, 
this figure rises to 18.7 per cent for those in the 45–56 age group, and up to 32.2 per cent 
for those aged 66 or over. According to this, the (average marginal) effect of the cost of 
voting becomes statistically significant for the individuals in the 46 to 55, 56 to 65, and 
66- plus age groups. That is to say, the cost of voting starts having a significant (and 
Table 2. Predictive Margins of Voting for Combinations of Values of P, Regret, and C in 
Santiago de Chile, 2017
Combinations Delta- method
Margin Std. err. [95 % Conf. interval]
Low P # Low Regret # High C 0.1037224 0.034042 0.0370013 0.1704435
Low P # Low Regret # Low C 0.2254788 0.0412622 0.1446064 0.3063512
Low P # High Regret # High C 0.4326259 0.0756915 0.2842732 0.5809785
Low P # High Regret # Low C 0.5905117 0.0535354 0.4855841 0.6954392
High P # Low Regret # High C 0.330069 0.0814733 0.1703843 0.4897536
High P # Low Regret # Low C 0.3865824 0.0433914 0.3015369 0.471628
High P # High Regret # High C 0.5641707 0.069314 0.4283178 0.7000236
High P # High Regret # Low C 0.7122961 0.0369689 0.6398385 0.7847537
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negative) impact on voting from 46 years on. This result is consistent with the idea that, 
from a certain age threshold, the costs of going to the polls will become increasingly 
onerous and shall therefore reduce the propensity to vote accordingly (Wass et al., 
2017).9
The central and right- hand side upper panels in Figure 4 show the two variables of the 
IVM and CVM that work differently depending on the sex of the citizen: the cost of vot-
ing and social pressure. In both cases, their effects have the expected sign for both men 
and women (the cost of voting has a negative effect, and social pressure a positive one), 
but they are only statistically significant for women. The next three graphs, that is, those 
below the upper panel, show the three variables whose effect on voting varies depending 
on the civil status of the respondent: the perceived probability of affecting election 
results, the cost of voting, and social pressure. The positive effect on voting of the per-
ceived probability of affecting election results and the negative effect of the cost of vot-
ing are only statistically significant for those who are not married; however, the positive 
effect of social pressure is statistically significant only amongst those who are married.
Finally, the lower panel in Figure 4 shows the three variables for which the interac-
tions with education display a noteworthy pattern: the perceived probability of affecting 
Figure 4. Average Marginal Effects of Instrumental and Non- Instrumental Motivations on 
Voting Depending on Socio- Demographic Factors in Santiago de Chile, 2017
Journal of Politics in Latin America 12(1)92
election results, the cost of voting, and social pressure. The left- hand side graph shows 
that the positive effect of the perceived probability of affecting election results on voting 
is restricted to those with low education; the central panel shows that the negative effect 
of the cost of voting is likewise constrained to the lower educated; and the right- hand 
side panel shows that the positive effect of social pressure is, as the other two, circum-
scribed to those without higher education.
Table 3 summarises the results on the intertwinement between the effects on voting of 
IVM or CVM variables, on the one hand, and socio- demographic ones, on the other. As 
formulated in H2, we expected weaker effects amongst older citizens, but we find instead 
stronger (negative) effects of the cost of voting. Our expectations and the evidence 
regarding sex are consistent; the (negative) effects of the cost of voting are only signifi-
cant amongst women, as are the (positive) effects of social pressure. Also, our expecta-
tions of weaker effects amongst those who are married are supported by our findings, 
since the perceived probability of affecting election results and the cost of voting only 
have statistically significant effects amongst those who are not married. Yet, running at 
odds with our expectation, social pressure only has effects on voting for those who are 
married. Finally, we expected weaker effects for those who have high than for those who 
have low education and, consistently with our expectation, the perceived probability of 
affecting election results, the cost of voting, and social pressure only have significant 
effects on voting for those with low education.
Conclusions
Although very influential worldwide, but particularly in the US political science scene, 
both the instrumental and consumption voter models (IVM and CVM, respectively) 
have many critics that have stated some limitations (Green and Shapiro, 1994). Moreover, 
the scarcity of empirical tests makes it difficult to clarify the extent to which these mod-
els are useful to understand voters’ decisions in different settings. As Maravall and 
Sánchez- Cuenca (2008: 2) put it, “although formal modeling has reinvigorated the the-
ory of democracy and defined the relevant questions in a sharp and rigorous way, we still 
have some reservations about its empirical relevance.” In relation to this, it may be 
argued that, if the instrumental and consumption voter models are sound, they should 
apply in every democratic context. Put differently, if the hypotheses are solid, they 
should travel. Similar claims have been repeatedly advanced by other authors in compar-
ative works.10 Using a post- election survey of the 2017 Chilean national elections with 
adequate indicators, we have reassessed the instrumental and consumption voter models 
in Santiago de Chile. To our knowledge, it is the very first time that this exercise has been 
undertaken in a Latin American context with a full array of instrumental and consump-
tion variables. The immediate question is whether the extension to other polity of the 
empirical findings obtained in Western democracies could be taken for granted or not.
Our answer is mixed. Our results show that the IVM travels well to Santiago de Chile, 
but the CVM does not. In particular, we find statistically significant effects for three out 
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have if he/she abstained and his/her party lost by only one vote, and the costs of voting 
(C); only the party differential, B, fails to attain statistical significance. In contrast to this, 
none of the variables of the consumption voter model (the belief that voting is a duty, the 
will to sustain democracy, and the perception that there is social pressure to vote) are 
significant.
The failure of the consumption voter model calls for further reflection and opens the 
door for more research. The irrelevance of the CVM factors is especially striking in the 
case of duty to vote, one of the key factors in the voting literature. The absence of sig-
nificant effects may have to do with the fact that the measures used in this paper may be 
capturing different concepts in earlier studies (as those in Canada, the Netherlands, and 
Spain) than in Santiago de Chile. In the former, they are related to the belief that there 
exists a social or moral duty to vote. In the latter, they may uncover perceptions on the 
legal status of voting, given that this status had changed from compulsory to voluntary 
voting in the 2012 electoral reform, together with registration, which changed from 
voluntary to automatic. Does this mean that duty works differently in countries where 
voting has always been voluntary, where it has always been compulsory, and in coun-
tries that have switched from a voluntary to a compulsory system or vice versa? We 
certainly need more research on this. More generally, the lack of significance of all the 
CVM variables is possibly related to the fact that more than 25 per cent of Chileans 
were indifferent amongst a democratic or an authoritarian regime or even preferred the 
latter.11
We have also sought to advance our general knowledge on the working of the IVM 
and CVM by inquiring on how the effects of the factors of these models vary for individ-
uals with different socio- demographic characteristics. This is also a novel inquiry. 
Scholars have so far focussed the bulk of their attention on whether these factors are 
significant or not and on how large their effects are, but efforts to determine what factors 
condition the existence or size of such effects are extremely rare, at best. We show that 
citizens do not respond in a unanimous, synchronised, and similar way to the instrumen-
tal and consumption motivations facing them. Individuals of different sex, age, educa-
tion, and civil status display different sensibilities to both instrumental motivations (for 
instance, P matters only for those who are not married), and consumption ones (for 
instance, social pressure matters only for the low educated), as well as for the costs of 
voting (e.g. their effect is larger for older citizens).
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Notes
1. A noteworthy exception is Gabriela Rangel (2017) dissertation. Her data cover two variables 
related to the CVM, but none to the IVM.
2. In these elections, a new electoral system (with the D’Hondt formula for the House of 
Deputies, 28 districts, and an average magnitude of 5.5 seats) was employed (Gamboa and 
Segovia, 2016: 133). Moreover, registration was automatic, and voting, voluntary.
3. For further information regarding the election law reform in Chile, see Barnes and Rangel 
(2014).
4. According to World Bank data (see https://www. indexmundi. com/ facts/ indicators/ SI. POV. 
GINI/ rankings), in 2015, Chile was the fourth most unequal country in South America after 
Brazil, Colombia, and Paraguay, and ranked twenty-third out of a total of one hundred and 
fifty-eight countries.
5. Additionally, in 2015 the electoral system was reformed from a binominal to a proportional 
system (Gamboa and Morales, 2016).
6. Montero et al. (2019) found that, in the 2017 elections, non-voters’ profiles are more complex: 
in addition to being young and having a lower habit of vote, they belong to the lower social 
class, have low educational levels, are politically less informed, do not identify with any 
political party, do not belong to any association, and do not talk about politics with friends or 
family members.
7. In the last 2017 elections, in a 1–10 ideological scale, where 1 means left and 10 right, the 
average self-placement by voters of the main left-wing coalition, Frente de la Mayoría (FM), 
was 3.2, whereas the figure for the main right-wing coalition, Chile Vamos (CV), was 7.3 
(Santana et al., 2018).
8. In contrast with this survey-based evidence, official electoral results reveal that women vote 
slightly more than men. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making us aware of 
this point.
9. Figure A1 in the appendix confirms that, apart from the youngest individuals, who do not 
vote much regardless of the cost of voting (the predicted probability of voting is close to 0.4 
irrespectively of it), those who have lower costs tend to vote more than those who have higher 
costs. In the oldest age group (more than 66 years), those who have low costs turn out almost 
twice as much as those who have high costs (67.6 vs. 35.4 per cent).
10. See, for instance, the arguments on the relationship between turnout and invalid votes by 
Martínez i Coma and collaborators (Martínez i Coma and Trinh, 2017; Martínez i Coma and 
Werner, 2019).
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11. These figures come from the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) dataset for 
Chile, a post-election survey undertaken by Feedback for the Faculty of Communication 
and Arts, Universidad Diego Portales (UDP), Santiago, in November and December 2017 
through face-to-face interviews with a representative sample of 1,600 respondents living in 
urban areas of Greater Santiago, Greater Valparaíso, and Greater Concepción (CNEP, 2018).
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Appendix
  
Figure A1. Predictive Margins of Voting as a Function of the Costs of Voting and Age 
in Santiago de Chile, 2017
